Prospects for constitutionalization of the WTO by NELSON, Douglas R.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RSCAS 2014/63 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
Global Governance Programme-112 
Prospects for Constitutionalization of the WTO 
 
Douglas R. Nelson 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
European University Institute 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
Global Governance Programme 
 
 
 
Prospects for Constitutionalization of the WTO 
 
  
 
Douglas R. Nelson 
 
EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2014/63 
 
   
This text may be downloaded only for personal research purposes. Additional reproduction for other 
purposes, whether in hard copies or electronically, requires the consent of the author(s), editor(s).  
If cited or quoted, reference should be made to the full name of the author(s), editor(s), the title, the 
working paper, or other series, the year and the publisher. 
 
 
 
ISSN 1028-3625 
© Douglas R. Nelson, 2014 
Printed in Italy, May 2014 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 
I – 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy 
www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Publications/ 
www.eui.eu 
cadmus.eui.eu 
  
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS), created in 1992 and directed by Stefano 
Bartolini since September 2006, aims to develop inter-disciplinary and comparative research and to 
promote work on the major issues facing the process of integration and European society. 
The Centre is home to a large post-doctoral programme and hosts major research programmes and 
projects, and a range of working groups and ad hoc initiatives. The research agenda is organised 
around a set of core themes and is continuously evolving, reflecting the changing agenda of European 
integration and the expanding membership of the European Union.  
Details of the research of the Centre can be found on:  
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Research/ 
Research publications take the form of Working Papers, Policy Papers, Distinguished Lectures and 
books. Most of these are also available on the RSCAS website:  
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Publications/ 
The EUI and the RSCAS are not responsible for the opinion expressed by the author(s).  
 
The Global Governance Programme at the EUI 
The Global Governance Programme (GGP) is research turned into action. It provides a European 
setting to conduct research at the highest level and promote synergies between the worlds of research 
and policy-making, to generate ideas and identify creative and innovative solutions to global 
challenges. 
The GGP comprises three core dimensions: research, policy and training. Diverse global governance 
issues are investigated in research strands and projects coordinated by senior scholars, both from the 
EUI and from other internationally recognized top institutions. The policy dimension is developed 
throughout the programme, but is highlighted in the GGP High-Level Policy Seminars, which bring 
together policy-makers and academics at the highest level to discuss issues of current global 
importance.The Academy of Global Governance (AGG) is a unique executive training programme 
where theory and “real world” experience meet. Young executives, policy makers, diplomats, 
officials, private sector professionals and junior academics, have the opportunity to meet, share views 
and debate with leading academics, top-level officials, heads of international organisations and senior 
executives, on topical issues relating to governance. 
 
For more information:  
http://globalgovernanceprogramme.eui.eu 
 
  
Abstract 
The WTO is regarded as one of the few successes of (proto-) constitutionalism in response to 
globalization. However, the rapid deepening of economic integration that has occurred in recent 
decades has meant that the relevant civil society is less obviously well-represented by nation-state 
representatives, while the expansion in WTO membership and its coverage implies a constitutional 
claim that neither the WTO process nor the resulting structure supports. This paper characterizes the 
challenges confronting the WTO through the lens of constitutionalization. It discusses the link 
between globalization and interest in the WTO; what constitutionalization might mean for the WTO; 
and considers two models of constitutionalization in the WTO: an “English” model of court made law 
without a discrete constitutional moment; and an “American” model of a constitutional convention. 
Keywords 
WTO, global governance, constitutions, civil society 
 1 
Introduction* 
The creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) was, in a very real sense, a gamble. The act of 
creating the WTO was constitutional.
1
 Although themselves governments in their own countries, the 
contracting parties of the GATT were a (narrowly construed) civil society. The narrowness was 
twofold: first, the membership was entirely made up of governments; and second, the political order 
created referred to a single issue-area only (international trade and, even there, primarily border 
measures).
2
 Nonetheless, the governments (as represented by trade officials) were a genuine discursive 
community. The gamble lay in the fact that the constitution itself was massively incomplete. This is 
not incompleteness in the sense essential to the economic theory of contracts (i.e. unable to specify all 
contingencies), but rather a reflection of the political impossibility of specifying details essential to the 
operation of the institution as a constitutional order. The gamble lay in the hope/belief that the 
members would be able to fill in these gaps with the passage of time.
3
 The risk, of course, was always 
that the members would not be able to cover the promissory note. The holes in the agreement are in 
places that members could not agree on in the first place. In addition, the manifest successes of the 
WTO, especially its dispute settlement mechanism, has made this problem even harder. The WTO is 
now seen as one of the few successes of (proto-) constitutionalism in response to globalization. As a 
result, it is now seen as a prime site for conflict over the future political order of a globalized world. 
Of course, this is evidence of the existence of an emergent global civil society. 
The main argument of this paper is that the political and economic foundation of the world trading 
system was transformed by the rapid globalization in the last two decades of the 20
th
 century and by 
the creation of the WTO. Specifically, in a world where nation-states were politically and 
economically sovereign it made perfectly good sense to think of a collection of (the representatives of) 
those states as being a civil society relative to an issue like international trade.
4
 The very success of the 
post-War Liberal international economic arrangements produced a striking degree of economic 
integration of national economies, reducing economic sovereignty without producing anything like an 
equivalent advance in political integration. This took place in the context of domestic political systems 
in which, for better or worse, governments had accumulated increased obligations to produce such 
economic goals as stability, equity and growth (this short list is obviously only illustrative). In this 
context, the creation of the WTO, in an effort to render the trading system more rule-based and less 
                                                     
*
 Presented at the Future of the World Trading System conference, 18-19 April, Washington, DC. For many extensive 
comments prior to the workshop, I would like to thank Mike Finger, Craig Murphy and Rorden Wilkinson. At the 
workshop, Steve Charnovitz made extensive insightful comments. The general discussion of the paper at the workshop 
was at a high level and I would like to thank all of the participants. The fact that this paper still falls short of what it might 
have been if I had been able to take all of those comments into account is my own fault. 
1
 The very large literature, primarily by lawyers, on Constitutionalism of the WTO treats “Constitutional” in a more 
specific sense—i.e. whether the WTO satisfies, or even can satisfy, a set of conditions that renders the WTO (and its 
constitutive documents) as a kind of superior law. Cass (2005) provides an extensive overview of this literature. 
2
 Keohane and Nye (2001) refer to this as a “club model”. Since neither “club” nor “model” seems useful in describing the 
WTO in our context, I will not use this term. Keohane and Nye, early in their paper, make reference to Herbert Simon’s 
(1996) notion of “decomposable hierarchies” to denote international regimes with the two traits noted in the text. This 
seems more immediately useful. 
3
 The model, in some sense, was the EU. The EU began life as a more narrowly construed economic agreement (the ECSC 
and the EEC), which accumulated members, responsibilities, and constitutional structure with the passage of time. This 
has led to a nontrivial subliterature specifically analyzing this comparison (see, e.g., the papers in Weiler, 2000, e   rca 
and Scott, 2001). The difference is that, at every step, the European integration program was understood to be a political 
programme; where the GATT/WTO system was understood to be narrowly economic. Functionalist logic might see the 
latter accumulating members and trade-specific responsibilities, but it was never seen as a base from which a new, 
broader political order would grow. 
4
 The same is, of course, true for the organization and operation of the Bretton Woods institutions. 
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diplomacy-(or power-) based, could not rely on the same degree of claim to constitutional legitimacy. 
On the one hand, the same conditions that make multilateralism so important make identifying 
“responsibility” for conditions with broad impact difficult (to impossible) and render it unlikely that 
communities of interest are constrained within national boundaries. That is, the striking degree of 
economic integration has meant that the relevant civil society is less obviously well-represented by 
nation-state representatives in a technocratic (rather than political) process. On the other hand, the 
expansion of membership, as well as the domain of applicability well beyond tariff cutting, with a 
claim that the rules should be to some non-trivial degree binding on its members, makes a 
constitutional claim that neither the process nor the resulting structure supports. The programme of 
filling in the missing constitutional structure in the WTO can be seen as a struggle for the soul of the 
WTO between the descendants of the 18
th
 and 19
th
 century liberals who would like to constitutionally 
restrict governmental intervention in the market (in this case, the world market) and the modern social 
democrats who would like to expand the range of rights constitutionally treated.
5
 
This short paper seeks to characterize the challenges of the WTO moving forward through the lens 
of constitutionalization. I begin by asking about the link between globalization and interest in the 
WTO; the following section is a bit more explicit about what constitutionalization might mean/imply 
for the WTO; and the last substantive section considers two models of constitutionalization in the 
WTO (an “English” model of court made law without a discrete constitutional moment; and an 
“American” model of a constitutional convention). 
The WTO and Globalization: Why do people care about the WTO? 
Economic globalization implies tighter linkages between national economies. The relative importance 
of, to say nothing of the relationship among, international flows of goods and services, people, and 
financial capital in constructing these tighter linkages is not completely clear, but the fact of increased 
linkage is unambiguous. With the probable exception of international migration, this globalization 
reflects, at least in part, the striking success of half a century of collective effort by the political 
representatives of the nation states that make up the international economy. Very broadly speaking 
(i.e. recognizing that the conclusion to follow requires a variety of well-known qualifications), these 
tighter linkages should imply greater aggregate welfare. That is, by allowing the allocation of factors 
and goods to better reflect the global distribution of tastes and incomes, global product should be 
increased and, at least potentially, so should global welfare. As a result, our usual interpretation, as 
economists, is to see this as a success of rational decision-making by far-sighted policy-makers acting 
in the interest of society as a whole. 
And yet, the process of institutionalizing globalization is never smooth. The same governments that 
reflect this far-sighted, welfare-maximizing rationality seem to resist further liberalization at every 
step. Our usual first line of explanation is domestic distributive politics—the losers from the 
redistributive impacts of liberalization resist liberalizing policy change. After all, the gains from 
globalization are distributed unequally across countries and, perhaps more importantly from a practical 
point of view, within countries. While this is surely part of the explanation, another part has to do with 
erosion of the domestic policies that support liberalization. It is now widely recognized that 
stabilization of the national economy at a relatively low level of unemployment, along with relatively 
generous income support for the unemployed, plays a sizable role in permitting ongoing 
                                                     
5
 This ignores a distinct dimension in the constitutional analysis of the world trading system between those who seek an 
increasingly well developed, and increasingly binding, set of rules regulating the relations between nations and those who 
seek a return to a more diplomatic approach to trade governance. 
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liberalization.
6
 Citizen support for globalization has never (and nowhere) been strong. However, as 
long as the economy is relatively stable, and the costs of unemployment relatively low, policies 
supporting liberalization can be depoliticized. Specifically, these policies can be removed from 
domestic politics as an essential part of, for example, foreign policy. Thus, the creation of the Bretton 
Woods/GATT international system was seen as supporting the Cold War policies of a succession of 
post-War governments in the West. The elite consensus that globalization had supported strong 
macroeconomic performance provided support for continuation of the global liberalization programme 
even in the aftermath of the Cold War.
7
 In particular, the end of the Cold War coincided, loosely 
speaking, with the fading of the economic “golden age” (Eichengreen, 2006), and protecting that 
programme required increasing elite effort. Similarly, as “natural” rates of unemployment crept up, 
and government social programs were eroded, anti-globalization began to be seen as a natural 
language of social protest. Substantial research supports the claim that globalization makes 
independent macroeconomic policy, redistributive policy, and regulatory policy more difficult.
 8
 One 
conclusion that can be drawn from this fact is that governments should simply eschew such policies 
and pursue increasingly rigorous market conforming policies. Unfortunately, since it is precisely these 
policies that had created the political support for globalization, an alternative conclusion was that 
retreat from globalization would produce a return to the golden age. With the onset of the 2007/8 
financial crisis, this problem was thrown into high relief. 
Proponents of constitutionalization of the WTO come from both of these tendencies—those that 
want to lock in relatively strong forms of Liberalization and those that want to introduce increasingly 
stringent social concerns. In understanding how these positions relate to globalization and the WTO, it 
proves useful to recall the earlier debates about the relationship between democracy and capitalism. 
Faced with the global economic crisis of the 1930s, a number of analysts of the right (e.g. Schumpeter, 
1942/1975) and the left (e.g. Polanyi, 1944/2001) concluded that capitalism and democracy were 
inconsistent with one another.
9
 Schumpeter (pg. 61) concluded that capitalism could not survive, while 
Polanyi (pg. 138) argued that democracies would see oscillation (a “double movement”) between 
“economic liberalism” and “social protection”.10 The two poles of Polanyi’s double movement are the 
same poles as those occupied by proponents of WTO constitutionalization. 
In thinking about the tension between capitalism and democracy, it is useful to conceive of the 
Liberal political economy as containing three broad components: the state; the economy; and civil 
society.
11
 The first two require very little comment. The economy produces and distributes the 
material conditions on which the rest of society depends and, ideally, the Liberal economy is a realm 
                                                     
6
 This link between liberalization and provision of macroeconomic stability and social insurance is often referred to as 
“embedded liberalism” (Ruggie, 1982). Among recent work that has stressed the role of such policies in supporting 
globalization in the aftermath of the Second World War is Bordo, Eichengreen and Irwin (1999). 
7
 This was, of course, part of the broader elite consensus on Liberal policy that produced domestic de-regulation in a 
number of domains of economic policy. 
8
 The most systematically studied reflection of this claim concerns monetary policy, i.e. Mundell’s trilemma (Klein and 
Shambaugh, 2010), but similar concerns have been extensively studied in the relationship between globalization and 
taxation (Tanzi and Schuknecht, 2000, Swank and Steinmo, 2002), and globalization and welfare state provision (Huber 
and Stephens, 2001). 
9
 For an excellent survey of the large literature on this question, as well as a substantial amount of new research, see 
Rueschemeyer et al. (1992). The conclusion of this work is that, contra Polanyi and Schumpeter, as an empirical matter, 
capitalism and democracy are strongly co-varying, but that finding a compelling account for this fact is rather difficult. 
10
 Schumpeter predicted the triumph of socialism, Polanyi feared, but did not definitely predict, the triumph of fascism. 
Neither was happy with the predicted outcome. Polanyi may have been closer to right in the immediate moment, and his 
analysis of the “double movement” has had a longer shelf life than Schumpeter’s detailed analysis, but (especially given 
his rather broad definition of socialism) Schumpeter’s prediction seems the more accurate in the long run. 
11
 This is very much a Weberian characterization (Weber, 1922/1981, 1924/1978). With even older roots than the 
emergence of Liberalism, but playing a fundamental role in Liberal social theory, the family was seen as a realm of 
privacy, inviolable by the state and, thus, outside the analysis of the interaction of the other three elements. 
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of asocial competition among individuals.
12
 The state, the holder of a monopoly on the legitimate use 
of force in society, provides the legal conditions that make the economy possible. The Liberal civil 
society is a less common notion to economists, though absolutely essential if we are to think 
systematically about constitutionalization. The notion of civil society has evolved from, at least, 
classical antiquity, meaning quite dramatically different things at different points in time (Ehrenberg, 
1999). Where the economy is an asocial domain, civil society is fundamentally social. It is where the 
members of society work out, in public (through a variety forms of discourse), who they are as a 
group. Just as with the economy, the state provides the legal conditions that permit civil society to 
function, but civil society provides the moral (broadly construed) conditions under which the state 
operates. Similarly, the economy provides the material basis of civil society; but without the set of 
shared understandings that give meaning to people’s lives, the economy would not function. When 
each of these is in equilibrium internally and each with the others, society is stable. 
A distinctive aspect of capitalism as a social system (arguably the distinctive aspect) is the 
disembedding of the economy from civil society. That is, prior to the emergence of capitalism as a 
distinctive social system, there was no conception of economic relations as distinctive from other 
social relations. The evolution of the economy as a domain of social life wherein abstract (i.e. separate 
from broader social and political commitments), individually rational calculation determines the 
behavior of individuals permitted a historically unprecedented explosion of creativity and wealth 
creation (Mokyr, 1990, Clark, 2007). However, to maintain a stable social order, this dynamic domain 
needed, somehow, to be balanced by the social integration occurring in the family and in civil society. 
As the economy became decreasingly embedded in the day-to-day social relations of society, the risk 
of social crisis rose (Polanyi, 1944/2001, Rueschemeyer, Huber and Stephens, 1992, Mann, 1993). 
Figure 1: After Habermas 
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 This is a strikingly modern view. As recently as the late 18th Century, Adam Smith was still struggling to 
understand/explain how this could possibly work. A full, logical demonstration that it could work had to wait until the 
work of Arrow, Debreu, McKenzie, et al. in the 1950s. 
Economy 
Civil 
Society 
State 
Rationality Crisis 
Motivation Crisis 
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Social breakdowns can occur as a result of disequilibrium/crisis in any of the three systems, for 
reasons completely internal to that system. Competition among state elites can produce a political 
crisis; the evolution of alternative views of personal identity can undermine social identity (e.g. 
struggles over racial and/or gender rights); and, of course, internal economic dynamics can produce 
economy-wide crisis. For the purposes of this paper, however, we are interested, instead, in crises that 
emerge as a result of the links between the three sub-systems. Loosely following Habermas (1975), we 
can identify such crises as in figure 1. For example, if either the state or civil society fails to provide 
the background conditions for effective functioning of the market, the economy will function less 
efficiently. A sufficiently great deterioration will produce an economic crisis. We will call this a 
“rationality crisis” to reflect the fact that the source of the crisis is “infection” of individualist/rational 
economic norms by broader social norms and political programs. Similarly, politicization of conflicts 
emerging from the economy or civil society, that were previously contained within the specified sub-
system, which are sufficiently great to create a political crisis will be called a legitimation crisis. This 
reflects the fact that, if such conflicts cannot be contained, they call into question the capacity of a 
given government to govern.
13
 Finally, if state intervention or the spillover of individualist norms 
impoverishes the social construction of social identity which gives meaning to day-to-day life to such 
a degree that people feel isolated (i.e. not members of a community), we have a motivation crisis. The 
label derives from the fact that sociologists and social psychologists refer to the condition of such 
social alienation as anomie.
14
 
The evolution of the modern, democratic, capitalist political economy can be described in general, 
and in national specificity, in terms of the evolution of such crises and the institutional responses to 
them. The tension between democracy and capitalism emerges from the fact that where the former 
empowers the average (“median” in spatial voting theory) citizen, the latter, as well as producing 
aggregate wealth, produces substantial inequality.
15
 In particular, autonomous nationalization of 
markets, along with the attendant expansion of politicization of struggles between firms, and between 
factors of production, led to governments increasingly to intervene in an attempt to restabilize the 
political economy. In the early stages of this history, the primary axis was the link between economy 
and the state. There was no widespread notion that the state had redistributive obligations, or even any 
responsibility for macroeconomic performance (especially unemployment). Depending on the state of 
pre-capitalist legal, political and economic structures, and the particular forms of early capitalist crises, 
states adopted nationally distinctive response to early capitalist economic crises—e.g. some 
emphasized stabilization through cartelization, others stabilization through antitrust. By the middle 
part of the 20
th
 century, however, mass mobilization for war had produced a dramatically more 
mobilized and politicized civil society. In addition, a sort of common sense Keynesianism implied that 
the demand for a governmental response to economic downturn, and the threat of unemployment, 
could be met by appropriate policy response.  y the early 1960s, this version of “modern capitalism” 
(Shonfield, 1965) was widely believed to have beaten the problem of an inconsistency between 
capitalism and democracy. At a modest cost in inefficiency, a combination of counter-cyclical 
macroeconomic policy with a redistributive welfare state could reap the benefits of capitalist 
dynamism without the destabilization that comes from skewed income distribution and high 
unemployment risk. Embedded liberalism (Ruggie, 1982) was believed to have produced a “golden 
age” (Eichengreen, 2006, Frieden, 2006). As Ruggie, Eichengreen, and Frieden all argue, there was a 
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 The ongoing fiscal politics in both the US and the EU would easily be examples. 
14
 In addition to Tönnies’ (1988) classic Community and Society, Robert Putnam’s work on the link between social capital 
and democracy (Putnam et al., 1993) and on the degradation of civil society (Putnam, 2000) is concerned with these 
issues. Putnam’s work, especially Bowling Alone, can be seen as an archetypal example of economic norms infecting 
civil society, with the consequence being a motivation crisis. That is, citizens become decreasingly able to see themselves 
as a community and, thus, to engage in the discourses that provide context to economic and political life. 
15
 For Schumpeter this inequality is the actual engine of capitalism, while for Polanyi it is simply a fact. The Public Choice 
version of this tension is given a formal representation in the Meltzer-Richard model (Meltzer and Richard, 1981). 
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concerted attempt to create a Liberal international economic order consistent with the domestic order 
of embedded liberalism. This involved movement toward free trade, fixed exchange rates and, 
initially, restrictions on international capital flows.
16
 
The stagflation of the 1970s, along with an alternative theory of the relationship between the state 
and the market in the form of monetarism, led to a reassessment of, first, the macroeconomic 
component of embedded liberalism, and then a more systematic attack on large scale government 
intervention in the economy. The successes of deregulation and the great moderation further 
entrenched the political response to government intervention, while rapid globalization, especially of 
financial markets, put additional pressure on monetary, fiscal and redistributive policy. Both 
supporters and opponents of this trend saw globalization as playing an important role in promoting 
liberalization of the domestic political economy. 
Even before the 2007/8 crisis, for the first time since before the Great Depression, trade was 
becoming a focus of public politics. On the whole, this was episodic—e.g. the role of NAFTA in the 
1996 presidential campaign of Ross Perot and the 1999 protests at the Seattle WTO ministerial 
meeting—and has still not generated sustained public politics on trade, but given the absence of any 
public trade politics of significance since the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, these sorts of 
events take on greater significance. In particular, even though opposition to international trade 
liberalization may not have developed a sustained popular following as a public political issue, it has 
become sufficiently risky that even strong supporters of domestic Liberalization are finding the issue 
sufficiently risky that it can no longer be assumed that it can be treated as a technical issue, delinked 
from domestic politics.
17
 This is the context in which we need to consider constitutionalization of the 
WTO. 
From the start, trade was very much part of the post-War Liberal order. Freeing international trade 
was seen to be a key element in reconstruction, at least as much because it was part of a capitalist 
order in a Cold War world as that it would be a handmaiden of growth (Gaddis, 2005).
18
 Domestically, 
however, proponents of trade needed to deal with active suspicion of trade liberalization on the part of 
citizens. Thus, the success of multilateral trade liberalization has relied primarily on depoliticization 
(Nelson, 1989). Associating trade policy with cold war foreign policy protected the liberalization 
process during the key years of building the GATT. Especially with the passing of the Cold War, as 
long as trade was seen as a second order issue in the context of a stable domestic economy, 
liberalization could proceed as a technical, foreign policy issue. In addition to the broader 
macroeconomic and redistributive policies we have already mentioned, institutionalization of the “no 
serious injury norm” via the administered protection mechanisms provided an additional layer of 
political protection to the multilateral liberalization process.
19
 
                                                     
16
 Note that the latter two were consistent, in terms of Mundell’s trilemma, with an independent macroeconomic policy 
targeted on domestic economic performance. 
17
 There is a peculiar sense in which the long period in which trade was delinked from public domestic politics made its 
proponents lazy. We have been so used to talking essentially only to ourselves that we have not thought about how to 
address a broader public on the issue. Most citizens are not well-trained economists, or well-socialized members of the 
professional trade community. They will not respond to arguments from efficiency, grounded in general equilibrium 
theory, and we are deeply uneasy with arguments from fairness that are the meat-and-potatoes of political discourse in 
civil society. Rejecting arguments in ways that we find compelling, without finding a way to make positive arguments 
that stick is a formula for failure. The point is not that we should construct some more-or-less specious argument about 
the fairness of Liberal trade (which will not convince anyone but ourselves), or lecture the public on how fairness is just a 
silly concept used to hide the self-interest of our opponents. We need to understand the terms of the public policy 
discourse so that we can engage with it in an effective way. 
18
 In the event, it was a very effective handmaiden of growth (Eichengreen, 2006). It was also, of course, very effective at 
locking in a strong market orientation. 
19
 This use of administered protection as a political safety valve had been well-understood at least as far back as Viner’s 
(1923) classic Dumping: A Problem in International Trade. 
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It is arguable that multilateral trade liberalization has been the most successful collective effort at 
international economic cooperation ever.
20
 Over seven rounds, the GATT process produced sizable 
drops in protection, began to impose discipline on antidumping and other non-tariff measures. Over 
this same period, world trade has consistently grown faster that world income, meaning that the share 
of trade in world income has risen. This success was crowned with the creation of the WTO in the 8
th
 
(Uruguay) round. The executive function (the Secretariat) was already well-established, but now had a 
more secure institutional foundation. The ministerial conference serves a quasi-(proto-) legislative 
function. It does not sit in continuous session and its rules (essentially unanimity for any business of 
significance) constrain it from actually doing much in the way of legislating. Even though the round 
that created the WTO took nearly 9 years and produced its (admittedly extraordinary) outcome only 
through serial brinksmanship, there was no agreement to produce a more functional legislative 
function.
21
 The big innovation was the creation of a proto-judicial function which was more than an 
adjunct to an essentially diplomatic process.
 22
 Furthermore, in terms of caseload determination and 
compliance, this mechanism is widely seen as a success (see e.g. Bown, 2009, Hartigan, 2009).
23
 
Against a background, especially since the 1980s, of rapid globalization and apparent pressure on 
the core policy supports of embedded liberalism (seen to be at least partly a function of that 
globalization), the WTO stands out as both effective and, in some loosely constructed way, 
governmental. As a result, proponents of global (and, usually, national) Liberalization and opponents 
of global (and, usually, national) Liberalization have come to see the WTO as an important arena for 
contesting the future of globalization and democracy. Similar sorts of concerns are directed at the 
World Bank and the IMF, but those institutions are less obviously (proto-) governmental. The UN may 
be (proto-) governmental, but is not obviously effective. Faced with increasing domestic resistance to 
globalization and, given the effectiveness of the WTO in restricting the use of standard border 
measures of protection, proponents of global Liberalization would like to more strongly lock in 
existing disciplines on border measures and extend those disciplines to behind the border measures 
(the Singapore issues). Similarly, opponents of global Liberalization would like to extend the 
objectives of global regulation beyond efficiency, reinterpret existing disciplines, and extend the reach 
of such reinterpreted disciplines to core non-trade concerns (especially environment and labor rights). 
 oth groups see something called “constitutionalization” as a route to achieve these goals—though, 
obviously, the routes are rather dramatically different from one another. 
The WTO and Constitutionalization: Why worry? 
There is a surprisingly large literature on international constitutions and constitutionalization (e.g. 
Dunoff and Trachtman, 2009, Klabbers et al., 2009, Petersmann, 2012), and a sizable quantity of this 
work deals specifically with trade (Cass, 2005, Joerges and Petersmann, 2011). The great majority of 
this work is done by legal scholars. In this section, we want to define our core concept—international 
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 One could reasonably argue for the European integration project, but the sheer numbers and heterogeneity of the GATT, 
and then the WTO, are utterly different from the EEC/EU. 
21
 Unlike the creation of the GATT and its early rounds, which have been well documented and analyzed (Curzon, 1966, 
Kock, 1969, Curzon and Curzon, 1976, Irwin et al., 2008), and the Tokyo round, which is very well served by Winham’s 
(1986) excellent analysis, there is still no equivalent detailed political economic analysis of the Uruguay round. Though 
useful analyses can be found in Croome (1999) and Preeg (1995). 
22
 This should not be taken to imply an absence of political/negotiating elements. The process can be suspended at any point 
at the request of the complainant, panel results and appellate body results are ultimately adopted by the Dispute 
Settlement Body (the General Council sitting as the DSB), and enforcement is via suspension of concessions. 
Nonetheless, the process is considerably more “judicial” than under GATT 1947. 
23
 As the previous footnote partially suggests, the General Council sits at the center, providing political guidance and 
coordination to the (assume “proto-” and/or “quasi-” in front of each of the following) legislative, executive and judicial 
functions. 
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constitutionalization—and ask how we might identify constitutionalization in the case of trade. It will 
turn out that a key concept is the notion of a relevant international civil society, so we will take that 
concept up in a manner parallel to our discussion in the preceding section. Given those definitions, we 
will (briefly) ask whether we might say that the WTO constitutes a stage in global 
constitutionalization in general, or in constitutionalization of the international trade system in 
particular. 
Broadly speaking, I will construe constitutions, and constitutionalization, in two (clearly related) 
ways: as a superior form of legal norm; or as a set of institutions and practices deriving from such 
norms (Besson, 2009, Klabbers, 2009). In either case, this can be rooted in a specific document (like 
the US Constitution) or be the product of evolution via legal tradition (like the English constitution). 
These are unproblematic when applied to existing constitutional orders, but for our purposes (i.e. 
constitutionalization of the WTO), such a definition faces two serious problems: fragmentation of the 
constitutional order; and the political basis of such an order. The former is straightforward to express: 
if a constitutional order refers to the existence of a superior form of legal norm, is it meaningful to talk 
about a “trade constitution”? While one might have argued that trade constituted an autonomous legal 
domain during the years of the GATT, the attempt to extend the reach of the WTO either to behind the 
border measures or to “trade and …” issues undermines any current application of this claim. Thus, 
the relationship of a “trade constitution” to various national constitutions and/or to other partial global 
orders (e.g. human rights, environmental law, etc.) is a genuinely difficult problem (Walker, 2002). 
While important for any complete analysis of constitutionalization of the trade regime, this is not a 
central issue for this paper. 
The other issue, by contrast, is absolutely essential to any discussion of constitutionalization. That 
is, the fact of a constitutional order cannot really be separated from whatever legitimates that order. It 
is hard to think of how we might even begin such a discussion without some sense of political 
foundations. 
“When people think of constitutionalization, or constitutionalism, or any suchlike conjugation, the 
association is not only with something that is constituted in a technical sense, but also, and 
predominantly, with something that is constituted in a politically legitimate sense: a constitutional 
order is a legitimate order, deriving its legitimacy (in part at least) precisely from its constitutional 
nature.” (Klabbers, 2009, pg. 7) 
This returns us to the issue of civil society and its relationship to the putative constitutional order and 
the process of its production and reproduction. While procedural correctness is a major support of 
legitimacy, this is far from necessary or sufficient. Ultimately, legitimacy is granted by, or earned 
from, civil society. That is where any fundamental explanation must start. Unfortunately, the meaning 
of “international civil society” is highly contested. Nonetheless, this issue is precisely what makes the 
issue of constitutionalization interesting. To answer this question, we cannot fall back on the sorts of 
models that have been found convenient for answering many less fundamental issues in the operation 
of the WTO. The identity of “persons”, or “citizens”, when we are talking about globalization cannot 
be resolved by assumption. And, for this purpose, the convenient assumption that countries have the 
essential moral properties of persons is particularly problematic.
24
 By the same token, adopting the 
self-description “civil society group” does not provide any obvious standing either.25 
                                                     
24
 At the pole of power (Wolfers, 1951), this assumption has long been understood to be empirically sensible. In addition, 
the assumption that countries can be treated as persons seems to be a sensible first-order approximation for the analysis of 
trade bargaining, as with the fundamental early work of Mayer (1981) and the extensive development of that logic by 
Bagwell and Staiger (2002) and their many followers. The issue is considerably more problematic when the assumption 
of stable preferences matter—as, for example, in Trachtman’s (2008) export of Coasean logic to the international level. 
We need to be able to characterize participants in Coasean bargains as forward-looking rational, but governments, 
especially democratic governments, expect to change identity regularly (see e.g. Grieco et al., 2009). This tends to 
undermine the normative value of bargains struck at one point in time relative to their validity as a reflection of the 
agent’s interest at another point in time. This latter problem becomes more severe when we want to treat countries (or 
Prospects for Constitutionalization of the WTO 
9 
So how might we think about civil society in the case of the WTO? One approach would be to treat 
the set of states with full membership in the organization as the relevant civil society. First, as I noted 
in the introduction, the representatives of states certainly can function as a discursive community, and 
did so in the creation of the post-War international trade order revolving around the GATT. As we 
have already noted, the umbrella of cold war politics permitted early GATT conferees to treat trade as 
a narrowly technical, diplomatic issue. In this context, it is not unreasonable to view the 
representatives of the various contracting parties as unitary, rational individuals. Although 
representing different states, and even different interests within a given state, the ongoing process of 
cooperation on international trade liberalization produced a community of politicians, bureaucrats, 
lawyers, and economists with shared understandings of the economics and politics of trade that 
permitted a clear and coherent discourse.
26
 The manifest success of the early rounds tended to 
legitimate the efforts.
27
 This legitimacy contributed to the political foundation that permitted the 
GATT to expand its domain in the Kennedy and Tokyo rounds, ultimately permitting the creation of 
the WTO in the Uruguay round. However, the end of the Cold War, the increasingly heterogeneous 
membership, the increasing scope of the Agreement, and the globalization related dynamics discussed 
in the previous section, has rendered this understanding of the relevant civil society increasingly 
problematic. Domestically, the increasing politicization of globalization means that partisan change in 
government can imply change in the essential identity of the agents representing a given state. Perhaps 
more importantly, to the extent that globalization implies the creation of communities of interest not 
represented by a given state, the specific claim that nation state representatives represent the full range 
of interests is undermined. That is, the relevant discursive community, i.e. civil society, is no longer 
represented. 
A more serious problem for the states-as-civil-society position emerges as a result of the creation of 
the WTO as a formal organization—especially an organization with a state-like structure. John 
Jackson’s (e.g. 1998, 2000, 2006) analysis of the constitutionalization of the WTO revolves primarily 
around institutionalization. In his emphasis on rules versus politics, Jackson’s use of concepts like 
“trade constitution” and “constitutionalization” have more in common with work by political scientists 
on “legalization” (Goldstein et al., 2001) than the legal literature on constitutionalization of the WTO. 
(Contd.)                                                                  
their representatives) as moral agents engaged in discourse as members of civil society. There are, of course, technical 
fixes for this—especially the assumption of quasi-linear preferences (with the same linear good) for all agents. 
Interestingly, this is also the assumption necessary to make the Coase “theorem” an actual theorem (Hurwicz, 1995, 
1999, McKelvey and Page, 1999). 
25
 I see no value added to adopting “civil society” as a modifier in this analysis. A “civil society group” is no more, and no 
less, than a group—or what political scientists call a “pressure group” or “lobbying group”—relative to the politics of 
trade. In this context, Schattschneider’s (1960) distinction between the pressure system and democratic politics is relevant 
here. The latter, the discursive politics of democratic constitution, is the domain of civil society. A pressure group, or at 
least its members/representatives, certainly can, and often do, participate in civil society, but when they engage in 
lobbying (of, say, the WTO) they are a pressure group simpliciter. 
26
 Political scientists refer to such communities as “epistemic communities”: “…professionals from a variety of disciplines 
[with] (1) a shared set of normative and principled beliefs, which provide a value-based rationale for the social action of 
community members; (2) shared causal beliefs, which are derived from their analysis of practices leading or contributing 
to a central set of problems in their domain and which then serves as the basis for elucidating the multiple linkages 
between possible policy actions and desired outcomes; 3) shared notions of validity—that is, intersubjective, internally 
defined criteria for weighting and validating knowledge in the domain of their expertise; and (4) a common policy 
enterprise” (Haas, 1992, pg. 3). This analysis has been applied to both the early years of the creation of the GATT 
(Ikenberry, 1992) and to the Uruguay round (Drake and Nicolaïdis, 1992). While there is no implication that members of 
such a community agree on ends, epistemic communities are certainly a civil society with respect to a particular domain 
of the fragmented/pluralized/emergent global order. 
27
 The issue of the causal connection between GATT/WTO membership and liberalization/growth of world trade is 
somewhat fraught (Rose, 2004b, a, Subramanian and Wei, 2007, Tomz et al., 2007, Liu, 2009, Felbermayr and Kohler, 
2010). Nonetheless, a widespread belief in the efficacy of the GATT/WTO process plays a major role in attracting new 
members, as well as encouraging people to think of the WTO as a framework for more extensive organization of 
international politics of trade. 
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That is, Jackson emphasizes the emergence of a practical legal order over a limited domain of 
application. The agreements contained in the Uruguay round agreements constitute a superior form of 
law in the practical sense that they actually constrain the behavior even of the most powerful members 
of the system. The creation of a formal set of institutions, replacing the limbo-like GATT institutions, 
is an essential element of this legalization process. While these institutions inherit the legitimacy that 
flows from the process by which they were created, the historical successes of the GATT and the more 
contemporary successes of the dispute settlement mechanism seem to create the possibility that the 
WTO might be the basis for a more substantial response to the problems of globalization. In particular, 
the WTO came to be seen as both potentially governmental and potentially democratic. Such an 
understanding, however, involves an explicit move beyond what political scientists call the Westphalia 
system of sovereignty—that is, an understanding of the global political system that contemplates no 
carrier of sovereignty and political legitimacy than the nation state.
28
 
As long as strictly national economic policy was sufficient to manage the domestic politics of trade 
policy, and assuming that the main members of the WTO are democratic, it was not unreasonable to 
treat a broadly open process among legitimate national governments in much the same way as we view 
representative democracy. However, as we have already noted, much of the concern with globalization 
proceeds from a concern that this is no longer the case. This clearly expands the relevant civil society 
in ways not contemplated in the creation of the GATT or the WTO. The increasing linkage of people 
via new and old media surely plays a role in making this civil society increasingly self-conscious and 
lowers the cost considerably of a truly global political discourse. Unfortunately the public discourse is 
only part of the story of democratic legitimacy. There must be some mechanism that links such a 
discourse to the policy making machinery. That is, there must be a cost of ignoring the public 
discourse. However, once we move beyond a broadly Westphalian order (i.e. one with nation-states as 
the essential actors), it is hard to know where/how the democratic check will operate. 
It would seem that a minimal condition for any Liberal order is that, one way or another, civil 
society is defined in terms of, and democratic legitimacy ultimately flows from, natural persons 
(Peters, 2009). The notion that there is a global (or “transnational”, or something) discourse that is 
relevant to global trade policymaking seems unproblematic. This discourse certainly involves the 
academic discourses of economists, political scientists and lawyers. It equally certainly involves the 
discourses of more amorphous global communities linked via the internet. Given the discussion in the 
previous section, it should be clear that firms are not members of civil society (i.e. they are not natural 
persons), but they surely are an essential part of the broader political economy of international trade. 
Both firms and organized elements of civil society have legitimate standing to lobby governments in 
well-ordered national political systems. Such lobbying would seem to play an essential role in 
democratic political systems (without actually being democratic politics).
29
 While economists tend to 
see lobbying only as essentially corrupt (e.g. “protection for sale”), political scientists have long 
recognized that lobbying provides a flow of (often biased) information to the political system. The 
right of a free people to approach their government should never be reduced to “rent seeking”. If we 
                                                     
28
 Of course, at the time of the Peace of Westphalia (1648) “nationhood” would have been an unusual concept. However, as 
the interstate system evolved, nationhood became an essential concept. This is important for our purposes, because this 
understanding ties legitimacy to effective governance of (and, thus, representation of) a people (Rueschemeyer, Huber 
and Stephens, 1992, Smith, 1998). For a wide ranging discussion of the concept of sovereignty and its limits see Krasner 
(1999). 
29
 I take this useful distinction from Schattschneider (1960), who notes that all political systems have lobbying and that the 
politics of lobbying are asymmetric in all political systems. What sets democratic political systems apart is the presence 
of a free public discourse (i.e. the presence of a free civil society) and a broad electoral check. 
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are to think of the WTO in constitutional terms, we need to think of lobbying as an essential element. 
However, we should not confuse lobbying with civil society.
30
 
None of this solves the problem of the democratic check on global government. Part of the reason 
so many people argue for more extensive access to lobbying groups is as a substitute for a genuine 
democratic check. This strikes me as confused. There is no reason to believe that global lobbying 
is/will be any more representative than domestic lobbying, and many reasons to believe that it is/will 
be dramatically less representative. If this is correct, expanding the variety of voices lobbying the 
WTO does not solve the democratic deficit. Unfortunately, without a solution to this problem, talk 
about constitutionalization seems deeply problematic. One might reasonably argue for the virtues of 
legalization on broadly utilitarian grounds, but that would be a very different kind of claim.
31
 This is, 
for example, the foundation of Jackson’s (1989, 1998, 2000, 2006) argument for a rules-based order. 
Routes to Constitutionalization 
The previous section argues, implicitly, that a strong form of constitutionalization of the WTO is 
unlikely over a foreseeable time horizon. While a global civil society might well be emerging, the 
institutions necessary to link such a civil society to emergent state-like institutions are completely 
lacking (as is, I think, any notion of self-consciousness of such a civil society). That said, it is hard to 
deny that a reasonably well-institutionalized, and surprisingly effective, political order over the 
domain of trade is in place. We might reasonably ask how this order might be strengthened and 
extended, and the constitutional experience of countries is a reasonable place to look for inspiration.
32
 
As a practical matter, the legal and historical literature suggests that there are two places one might 
look to decide whether constitutionalism is occurring: the creation of formal institutional structures 
adopted by a community and a body of law giving systematic meaning to those structures; and a body 
of judicial interpretation creating an evolutionary constitutional structure.
33
 The WTO has shown 
elements of both of these approaches. 
The emergence of a constitution from some sort of constitutional convention is the most obvious 
form of constitutionalization (certainly to scholars from the US). Cass (2005), in her overview and 
analysis of research on the constitutionalization of world trade, characterizes constitutionalization in 
terms of the following six elements (pg. 19):
34
 
  
                                                     
30
 Because lobbying can be corrupt (and certainly sometimes is corrupt), national governments have anti-corruption laws, as 
well as rules regarding transparency, registration, etc. Presumably, were the WTO to move toward a more constitutional 
governmental model, such rules would be a necessary complement to a more open approach to lobbying. 
31
 While being broadly sympathetic to such a claim (it is certainly my main line of defense of the WTO), it is important for 
us to recall that the welfare theoretic foundations of such a claim are dubious at best. We cannot launch a Pareto claim, 
and it has been well-known since Bergson (1938) and Samuelson (1947) that the potential Pareto argument (i.e. the 
Kaldor-Hicks criterion) is normatively footless (Chipman and Moore, 1978). Reverting to the point in footnote 17, we 
must be willing to make, and defend, explicit normative arguments about the particular virtues of the WTO. 
32
 As we have already noted, the experience of the EU might well be a particularly useful source of such inspiration. I do 
not pursue the parallels here. 
33
 Surveys of this literature (Cass, 2005, Dunoff, 2009) generally include a third approach to constitutionalization, 
associated with Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (e.g. Petersmann and Harrison, 2005, Joerges and Petersmann, 2011). With 
respect to constitutionalization, however, this work is primarily normative in nature. This is not a criticism. I see 
Petersmann as engaged in precisely the sort of programme I argue for in footnote 17. That is, the existence of a specific 
right (in this case a “right to trade”) is not a source of law of the same sort as a specific constitutional document or an 
evolving body of legal interpretation. Otherwise, we might consider Locke (1988) or Rawls (1999) as sources of 
constitutionalization. 
34
 I have reordered these to collect what for Cass are the second and fifth elements at the end of the list. 
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A set of social practices to constrain economic and political behavior 
[The presence of] a political community to authorize its making and that community’s interests are 
represented; 
A process of deliberative law-making is necessary in order for a constitutionalized entity to 
emerge and for the members of the community to be constituted as the authors of its law; 
[The presence of] a level of social acceptance, or legitimacy, of the process itself; 
A new foundational device or Grundnorm such that what was once merely a set of rules is 
transformed into a coherent and unified body of rules with the appearance of a new system of law; 
and 
[It must] entail some realignment of the relationship between the sub-entities and the central, 
putatively constitutional entity. 
The first four conditions are consistent with our analysis to this point: the first identifies a constitution 
as a superior form of law; while the second through fourth emphasize legitimation and democracy. 
The final two elements clearly imply an explicit break with the past.
35
 The fifth suggests that this 
break takes the form, at least in part, of an explicit act of law/institution-making. I think of this as the 
US model of constitutionalization and, especially in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
this was taken as the standard model of constitutionalization. 
Part of the attraction of the WTO as a focus for global state-making and constitutionalization is that 
one could interpret the Uruguay round as a sort of constitutional convention and the product of that 
round as constitutional of a trade order. The legitimacy that flows from both the broadly democratic 
form of its creation and the manifest success of the dispute settlement mechanism is precisely what 
emboldened both Liberals (who seek to extend market protections beyond trade in goods) and, for 
want of a better term, progressives (who want to introduce a broader range of concerns into trade and 
other domains) to interpret the WTO in constitutional terms. 
The problem with this interpretation moving forward is that the original “constitution” created no 
mechanism for amendment of that “constitution”. Thus, the only such mechanism currently in place 
would seem to be a new constitutional convention. Unfortunately, this is precisely how many have 
come to see the current and future rounds of WTO negotiations. This is “unfortunate” for two reasons. 
First, although there is widespread dissatisfaction with the current “constitution”, there are no formal 
rules of amendment and there seems to be no consensus (at all) on an acceptable form for a new 
constitution. In the absence of such a mechanism and consensus, it is hard to see how the WTO can 
develop new structures in the face of changes in the economic and political environment in which it 
operates. Second, this appears to roll together the normal “legislative” business of the ministerial 
conference (tariff negotiation, admission of new members, etc.) and the business of re-writing the 
constitution. Progress on the current round is currently hostage to constitutional issues (e.g. 
rebalancing, Singapore issues, other “trade and…” issues, etc.). It is clear that separating normal 
legislative business from constitutional amendment would be a Good Thing, however, such an act 
would itself be constitutional and it is hard to imagine that those countries that prioritize amendment 
over marginal adjustments in market access will acquiesce in an explicit separation of these tasks.
36
 
                                                     
35
 This is interesting, given that Cass’ (2001) original contribution to this literature stresses judicial interpretation (what I 
think of as the “ ritish” route to constitutionalization). 
36
 In fairness to the negotiators of the Uruguay Round agreements, they did not see themselves a framers of a constitution. 
They merely wanted to create a formal foundation for the practices that were already in place (as well as improving the 
dispute resolution mechanism). Thus, the fact that they did not formally work out a set of relations between legislative, 
executive and judicial activities of the WTO, nor create an amendment mechanism, is not surprising. Certainly some saw 
the Uruguay round agreements as loosely constitutional (again, John Jackson is the key reference here), but this is very 
much small “c” constitutionalism. Even Jackson was not suggesting that the Uruguay round was producing a fully blown 
Constitutional order. 
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Overall, the prospects for a new constitutional convention on trade seem poor. Major constitutional 
change usually takes place in the context of an event (or series of events) that creates the community 
that seeks to formalize itself. For the US, it was the revolutionary break with Great Britain (and even 
then the framers had to fudge the issue of slavery); for the Eastern European countries in transition, it 
was the collapse of the Soviet Union. Economic globalization may well create a trade environment 
that links most of the countries in the world, but it does not create a sense of community. 
By contrast, the British route to a constitution does not involve a decisive break with the past nor 
does it require a single, decisive act of legislation. Instead, the “English constitution” emerges from an 
evolutionary process (Bagehot, 1867, Dicey, 1885, Bogdanor, 1996, 2009 chapters 1 & 2). While the 
primacy of Parliament is the fundamental principle of the English constitution, the role of the Courts is 
enshrined in the Common Law tradition of court made law.
37
 This evolutionary approach, and the 
flexibility of the common law, seems to suggest that this is a route to WTO constitutionalization that 
need not run through a constitutional convention, and thus can avoid the problems that deadlock that 
process. The idea here is that the dispute resolution mechanism can generate a body of decisions that 
fills in the gaps in the “constitution” written in the Uruguay round (see e.g. Schloemann and Ohlhoff, 
1999, Stone Sweet, 1999, Cass, 2001, Howse, 2001, von Bogdandy, 2001, Weiler, 2001). There are 
two problems with this. The first is that the DSM is not intended to produce a cumulative body of law 
(i.e. individual decisions are not supposed to generate precedents). A decision would have to be made 
to change this and that, of course, would be constitutional—with all the problems the previous 
discussion suggests. The shrimp-turtle case is often discussed as an example of an emergent common 
law approach. However, this seems to be a controversial position. For example, Dunoff (2009) argues 
that this decision was so controversial that it might be taken as evidence against the common law 
interpretation. At a broader level, this argument is problematic because it implicitly assumes an 
institutional background that the WTO manifestly lacks. The English constitution (even as far back as 
Magna Carta) applied in the context of established, efficient, and broadly legitimate (though not, at 
that time, democratic) governance structures. This might arguably apply to the EU (e.g. Weiler, 1999), 
but it certainly does not apply to the WTO. In the modern context, such a common law approach 
would need to be anchored in some kind of broadly democratic structure linking civil society to 
authoritative decisions. Again, no such claim can be made for the WTO. 
Whether we think of taking the US route or the English route, we end up back at civil society. If a 
constitution (even over a relatively narrowly defined domain) is to be a superior form of law, in that it 
trumps domestic law (over that domain), if that law does not face some kind of relatively 
straightforward democratic constraint, then the international technocratic/political process just 
becomes a way of short-circuiting the domestic political process.
38
 While some proponents of both the 
Liberal and progressive tendencies seem to see this as a feature (i.e. not a bug), any reasonable reading 
of political history over the last couple of centuries suggests that this is a deeply problematic 
foundation for a political order. 
  
                                                     
37
 There is a certain irony that many of the same people that laud the common law tradition for its flexibility in the face of a 
changing environment also emphasize the virtues of strict construction in interpretation of the constitution. While, much 
like the rest of this essay, it surely reflects lack of socialization in academic law, the concept “constitutional common 
law” has always struck me as oxymoronic. 
38
 There is a substantial literature on the relationship between international and domestic law. My reading of this literature 
is that most scholars, at least as a practical matter, find the combination of superiority and direct effect a particularly 
poisonous combination (Jackson, 1992, Trachtman, 1999, Dunoff, 2008, von Bogdandy, 2008). 
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Conclusion 
Overall, then, and fully recognizing the constitutionalizing actions that created both the GATT and the 
WTO, under current economic and political conditions the WTO seems to be far from a constitutional 
order, even applying narrowly to international trade. As a practical matter, WTO agreements do seem 
to constrain the trade policy of members. However, this is not because WTO “law” has direct 
application in national legal systems, but because national governments believe that, very broadly 
speaking, the benefits from that system, even when it constrains national policy, exceed those 
(expectationally) associated with system breakdown. Thus, while the WTO does replace power with 
law, it does not create a constitutionally superior form of law. Similarly, while the Uruguay round 
agreements did create a series of institutions with (loosely) executive, legislative and, especially, 
judicial functions, there was no explicit division of authority (in fact, the Ministerial Conference is 
both the ultimate legislative and judicial [when sitting as the Dispute Settlement Body] authority) and 
there is no mechanism for amending the “constitution” except another constitutional convention. 
The virtue of thinking about the WTO in constitutional terms is to throw into high relief the central 
importance of civil society. Unfortunately, as we suggest above, this concept is far from clear in the 
global context and, even if it were clear, the complete lack of a mechanism through which civil society 
can check the operation of the WTO renders such discussion problematic. 
Alternatively, it might be useful to treat “constitutionalism” as a metaphor and use it to think about 
routes to a more restricted form of legal constraint—“legalization” in the language used by some 
political scientists (Goldstein, Kahler, Keohane and Slaughter, 2001). Here we considered the US 
route and the English route, but found both problematic. As a practical matter, of course, the WTO 
will continue to (attempt to) sponsor rounds and to resolve trade-related conflicts. These will evolve in 
response to specific events and, unless overwhelmed by some political crisis, may well evolve into a 
more constitutional order. The early functionalists’ hope for Europe ran through precisely such hopes, 
and those hopes seem to have been surprisingly well fulfilled.
39
 
  
                                                     
39
 It should be noted, however, that as the EU membership has widened, its ability to deepen its constitutional order appears 
to have weakened. If this is correct, it does not bode well for further constitutionalization of a community that includes 
159 members that are widely varying in economic, political and social dimensions. 
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